To appreciate the significance of the CMLIA in the development of the Witwatersrand gold mining industry's labour policies, and the factors which moulded its organizational structure, it is necessary to examine briefly the role which Chinese importation was designed to play in the crisis after the South African War. The elements of this crisis were falling rates of gold production and rising costs, in which problems of labour supply played a major but not exclusive part. Falling, or stagnant, production levels may be seen in yields of gold for the Witwatersrand as a whole, and for individual companies. Not surprisingly, Witwatersrand annual output declined from a pre-war peak of 4,295,608 fine ounces in I898 to I,690,IOI in I902. Although production rose constantly thereafter, output only surpassed the I898 level in I905 when 4,706,433 fine ounces were produced.7 Thus, for example, the French Rand gold mine which resumed crushing in September i902, only surpassed its i899 monthly output of 4,290 fine ounces in I905, after the addition of I,703 Chinese labourers at the end of I904.8 Rising costs may be identified in both of the main items of mine expenditure-labour costs and mine stores. The cost of African and White wages which had fluctuated before the war, rose constantly thereafter, despite attempts to use the war as an excuse to depress African wages: African wages reflecting the severe shortfall in numbers, White wages the changing ratio of White to non-White labour. Monthly wage rates for all Africans rose from 33S. in I902 to an average of 54S. 4d. in I903. Simultaneously the ratio of White to nonWhite labour contracted from i :8 in July I899 to I :5.98 in April I904,9 indicating an increased aggregate expenditure on White labour. The cost of mine stores was raised by the persistent decline in the value of gold relative to other commodities which became marked after I900, and continued until the outbreak of the First World War. Government policy only partially ameliorated this by reducing and reorganizing railway rates and tariffs in the Transvaal, after the Bloemfontein Conference in 1903.10 Such a generalized crisis became reflected in falling rates of profit and a flight of capital on the London money market, for this struck at the heart of the cost structure of Rand mining which made feasible a reasonable rate of profitable return. A generally low average grade of ore, an internationally fixed price for gold, and high initial investment and overhead charges 'meant that profits could only be secured through a very low level of costs and a high level of output. These factors determined that the two fundamental imperatives of profitable gold mining were the minimization of costs and the maximization of output (and by the same token, that the two great dangers were cost inflation and falling output).'11 The short lived post-war boom in gold mine shares collapsed at the end of I902 under the impact of this squeeze, and mining houses sought to lay-off some of their losses on unsuspecting capital markets in Europe. It has also been calculated that the return on original capital invested in large mines between I887 and I905 showed a marked decline between I903 and I905.12 In this situation of rising costs, falling or stagnant output, and falling profits and investment, the Witwatersrand mining houses turned towards the idea of importing Asian labour from early I903. The Chinese labour market was looked upon as a source from which sufficient labour at the right price might be acquired to break wage inflation, restore and maximize output by the most efficient deployment of labour, and thereby reduce working costs in order to restore the level of profitability and encourage capital back into the industry.13 As part of the British reconstruction programme the mining industry was actively encouraged and supported in this policy by Milner's colonial government.14 Yet the use of Chinese Chinese importation was then a part of a more general policy adopted by the mining houses to deal with the crisis of I9OI-4. The CMLIA, as the recruiting and shipping agency, was, in turn, part of the larger context of Chinese employment. What specific contribution was it designed to make to this situation? First and foremost the CMLIA was designed to secure sufficient Chinese labour to offset a major shortfall in the industry's rate of production, at a price compatible with the cost structure of the industry and in the face of a decline in the average grade of ore mined.. This would enable profitable production to be resumed at the same time as it would free other labour for deployment on developing properties. Thus the role of the CMLIA bore directly on the estimate of the Transvaal Labour Commission's Majority Report that there would be an immediate shortfall in the unskilled labour supply of 35,977 in July 1903 and of 368,637 workers in the foreseeable future.'9 Augmentation of the labour supply in this way also had important implications for future capital investment in the industry.
The CMLIA was designed to put a brake on cost inflation in five other ways. Firstly, by providing a sufficiently large additional external supply of labour, it was intended to reduce aggregate demand for African labour inside British South Africa and thereby lower the average wage rate. Secondly, it was intended to provide the mining industry with the means of by-passing the effects of continuing African access to productive land, which also bid up wage rates by creating relative scarcity. Both these functions of the CMLIA were ultimately dependent upon maximizing the supply of Chinese labour and subsequently ensuring an optimum pattern of efficient employment. Thirdly, the Chinese labour force was designed to be sufficiently cheap and docile so that importation was a more economical remedy than either changing the pattern of unskilled employment or altering the degree of capital intensity in the practice of winning gold. Such a labour force had the additional advantage of further fragmenting and dividing the working class in its struggle for higher wages. Fourthly, the CMLIA was also designed to give the mining industry some leverage in its fight against inflation in the cost of mine stores. The relative fixity of the proportion of mine stores as a percentage of mine expenditure, and the difficulty experienced by the mining houses in controlling their cost, meant that it was upon the wage bill that most of the pressure to lower costs had to fall, and more particularly upon the unskilled African sections of that bill. The pressure applied by the CMLIA's activities on this particular area, meant a relative freedom for the mining houses from the problems of inflation in the costs of stores. Lastly, the CMLIA was designed to ease pressure in the Portuguese East African labour market which had occurred concurrently with a crisis in the labour market in British South Africa.20
Labour shortage was more or less endemic in the Transvaal mining industry.21 The cost inflationary effects of such a situation had been met in several ways, one of the most important of which was the importation of long-term contract labour from Portuguese East Africa and elsewhere. This system had been established well before the war and was reestablished soon after. The CMLIA was clearly designed to fight cost inflation in the exploitation of the Chinese labour market. This was of crucial importance, for failure to control importation costs could make the remedy worse than the disease. The Chamber of Mines and WNLA were not unaware of this, as the Chamber's agent, Ross Skinner, had made clear in his preliminary report on Chinese labour the not inconsiderable dangers posed by rival recruiters, particularly those working for the Straits Settlements and South East Asia generally. This necessity for organized cost control was underlined by the desirability of acquiring the respectful tolerance of the British and Chinese governments. For their acquiescence in the scheme was a sine qua non of access to the market in the first place and of its continued exploitation.26 The days of uncontrolled and unregulated labour recruiting in China were long over, as the I904 Emigration Convention made very clear.27 Only the pooled resources of the mining companies could hope to meet these requirements satisfactorily enough to maintain state support without hopelessly escalating recruiting and shipping costs. The desire to maximize the supply of Chinese labour by exploiting as large an area of China as possible was also an important force making for cost control. Diverse and dispersed activities could easily weaken the industry's bargaining position in relation to the various contractors connected to the whole process of emigration, and expose the mining houses to expensive local difficulties. These factors alone would 24 
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The basis for the organizational structure of the CMLIA was its financial framework. The company, like WNLA, was designed to be non-profit making and represented a form of self-subsidy for the industry. It was designed to rationalize and stabilize investment in Chinese importation, at the same time as it provided the means of maximizing the supply of labour. Shareholders in the company were the individual mines of the Witwatersrand district only-unlike WNLA whose members were drawn from all parts of the Transvaal, and whose main means of revenue was not necessarily confined to the winning of precious metals. Shares were of a nominal value Of ?3, allocated to each company according to their unskilled labour complement determined on an industry wide basis. Shares in the CMLIA were never fully paid-up, i8s. being the first and only call on members. All of the I58,649 shares were issued in July 1904, giving the agency a nominal capital value of p475,947, and a paid-up capital value of ?142,794 zs. The board of directors, which was identical with that of the executive committee of the Chamber of Mines, was empowered to raise capital to the value of ?i,ooo,ooo, although this facility was never utilized. Capitation fees were an additional charge to members actually requiring Chinese labour complements. On average these charges worked out at ,17 5s. zd. per man for the whole expense of recruiting, importation and repatriation. The total cost of importation was actually higher than this if capital costs and advances are In addition to the staff at Tientsin, the agency had a nucleus of staff at Ch'inghuangtao and Chefoo for the management of the depots, together with a shipping adviser at Hong Kong, and, for a short time, some depot personnel at Laichikok near Kowloon in south China. Throughout the period of recruiting operations the receiving depots were under the direct control of the Transvaal emigration agents, the CMLIA being responsible for the provision of the accommodation, the conduct of recruiters, and the integration of the private requirements of the industry, like a provision of advances on wages and uniforms, with the official routine of embarkation. Under strong protest from the mining industry, African wage rates fell constantly from a monthly rate of 55S in June 1904 to 5Is. iid. in December 1905/January I906. At the same time as this was being effected, the increased fragmentation of the working class in the mines was also going ahead. The introduction of a strikingly isolated group of workers, differentiated in race and language, held out important longer term cost-structure implications for the mining industry as well. This was to be seen fairly rapidly in the course of the White miners' strike of I907, particularly at the Witwatersrand (Knights) Gold Mine where Chinese miners virtually sustained production during the stoppage. 45 The contribution of the CMLIA in these developments was noticeable, but it is important to be precise about them. They came from the direct effects of a new external labour supply of manageable proportions, deliberately controlled in size as well as cost. The CMLIA did not, in other words, provide the means to totally replace African labour: there were greater advantages to be secured by a combination of the two. It did achieve the beginnings of a permanent supplement to African labour. It appears, further, that there were sound cost considerations in this limited strategy. The high costs of Chinese importation made it an inequitable solution for the whole industry, with its mines of variable grade and working costs. The industry's appreciation of this may be seen in the financial structure of the CMLIA. Although the agency had the same features of self-subsidy as WNLA and the Chamber itself, and was fully integrated with the industry in terms of managerial control and policy, financially it remained a separate entity. Unlike external African labour supplied by WNLA, Chinese labour was not supplied at a cost representing the average cost of all unskilled labour. Thus capitalization and per capita rates for WNLA and the CMLIA remained separate-the latter charging more highly in both cases. All Witwatersrand mines contributed capital to both companies, which marginally lowered the differential cost for those using Chinese labour, but separate scales of paid-up share capital and capitation fees kept a balance in favour of the limited adoption of Chinese labour. Not that a limited adoption was incompatible with a general appreciation in the industry of its necessity. It was more a reflexion of the realities of the constraints of the Witwatersrand cost structure. The decision to capitalize and charge for Chinese labour on an individual company, as opposed to group, basis probably indicates the greater sensitivity of such a financial arrangement to these realities. In addition, this system did not stand in the way of differential group commitment to Chinese labour, or to subsidy by groups for those member companies taking the more expensive labour as a means of complement rationalization.46
The limited strategy also derived from the difficulty of ensuring the relative cheapness of Chinese labour. To ensure that Chinese labour was not prohibitive in cost, it was necessary to ensure four things: an absence of competitive recruiting by the mining companies to avoid raising the 46 Memo re Importation Costs, probably Jan. 1904 It would be a mistake to assume, however, that the CMLIA was uniformly successful throughout the period of recruiting operations. Behind the provision of a sizeable labour force in South Africa lay increasingly difficult problems in the Chinese labour market. The evidence indicates a growing inability on the part of the CMLIA to guarantee the necessary labour supply between July I904 and November I906. In some measure this is attributable to incidental factors. Thus the outbreak of 'relapsing fever' in the Ch'inghuangtao depot prior to the departure of the thirtieth and thirty-first shipments-s.s. Indravelli and Cranley-had a serious if temporary effect on the recruiting programme. Yet there were more deep-seated causes of these difficulties. They can be explained partly in terms of the pattern of the industry's initial approach to the Chinese labour market, which had necessitated, as we have seen, a widespread dependence on intermediaries, and a complex hierarchy of financial This was seen as a means of neutralizing local hostility to emigration. Either proposal should be seen in conjunction with the CMLIA's attempts to establish complete control over the receiving depots. There can be little doubt that the agency was pushing for a much greater degree of direct private control over Chinese recruiting and transportation arrangements as a means of improving their bargaining position in the labour market. The issue was still being debated in early 1907-showing the industry's continuing optimism as to the prospects of reopening recruiting.54 Underlying these difficulties were more fundamental problems than those generated by the initial emigration arrangements. There is evidence to suggest that the CMLIA was facing an almost constantly deteriorating situation in the labour market from early 1904 onwards, and this gave real urgency to the necessity of tightening control over its own arrangements. Initially, these difficulties were centred on the southern part of the market-particularly in Kwangtung province, although there are indications that strong opposition would have been encountered in Fukhien as well.
Opposition from rival employers, in this case the agents working for the South East Asian traffic, was intense and vociferous. With local official and gentry support for this opposition, the competition became unendurable and the CMLIA was forced to capitulate to an effective monopoly. By contrast, the north-eastern parts of China had some surplus migrant labour as the Russo-Japanese war temporarily closed up traditional areas of employment. This was particularly true of Shantung province, although the pressures diverting usual labour patterns were also operating in Chihli province, and even bringing down labourers from southern Manchuria. However as the war developed, and the Japanese began to establish their hold on Korea, intense competition for labour developed in the north also with little information from returning South African migrants to offset it. As early as March 1905 Brazier was complaining about the effects of crimping by Japanese interests in Shantung.55 By July 1905 competition was such that Wolfe, Transvaal emigration agent at Chefoo, was moved to comment: Emigration from this province (i.e. Shantung) could hardly have commenced under more favourable auspices. As the area affected by the Russo-Japanese war embraces the whole country to which emigration naturally tended, an excellent opportunity has arisen for turning it into a new channel. For close on a year coolies have been steadily drafted from this province to South Africa. Local superstition, official opposition and the scepticism of the people have in great measure been overcome. While the war continues it is not unreasonable to suppose that the supply of coolies will be adequate. The great question is how will matters stand when the war is over? Already difficulties are experienced whenever the Japanese require coolies and send a ship to Chefoo to collect them. All able-bodied men are taken, they are paid good wages, there is no medical examination, no questions are asked and coolies are not tied down by strict regulations. They are near their homes and can return when they please. Such are the prospects which at present attract many coolies, coolies brought from up country by the Transvaal recruiters to Manchuria. At the close of the war, they will no doubt be encouraged to emigrate there and take up what occupation they prefer.56 A determined press compaign against South African interests was also pursued in the Japanese-owned Chinese language newspaper, the Shantung Ji-pao. The ever widening gaps between shipments from mid-1905 onwards testifies to the truth of Wolfe's speculations. The thirty-second and thirty-third shipments which arrived in South Africa in August and September I906 respectively were particularly difficult to fill. By the beginning of I906, an additional problem had presented itself: the doubt
